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ER 85-060

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7 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DCI/DDCI Meeting with Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, 3 January 1985

1. Mr. McFarlane said that the President had spent a great deal of time studying and absorbing the arms control issues during his recent trip to the West Coast. Mr. McFarlane said he was pleased with how the President had handled this matter including his instructions to Secretary Shultz.

2. Regarding Larry Gershwin's paper on the Soviet fear of SDI, the DDCI offered that the Soviets will try to have Congress do their work for them; that they will string out negotiations, use their propaganda machine to portray the US as a producer of space war machines, with the hope that Congress will impose a moratorium on SDI.

3. Mr. McFarlane said that he was impressed with the briefings by [redacted] and Larry Gershwin which were well-balanced, well-articulated and well-presented. The President is very comfortable with the US position. He said that Secretary Shultz was duly impressed with Larry Gershwin's brief on the Soviet strategic situation.

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4. Mr. McFarlane noted he had brought the DCI's two papers to the President's attention and the latter was sobered by their outline of the verification issues. The President also noted these papers addressed the strategic implications of the verification problem rather than just dealing with specific events. [redacted]

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
5. The DDCI commented that we will win or lose SDI in the media. The Soviets are already seized with SDI, they are way out in front with their propaganda while the US side will be too late--once again, in a reacting mode. Rather, the USG should have a press campaign mapped out now which anticipates how the Geneva talks may go so we can get our view out instantly. Mr. McFarlane took notes and said he would look into this.

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8. Mr. McFarlane gave a rundown on Congressional briefings to advance the Arms Control/SDI and MX programs. The DCI commented that this seemed to be going well, but the same effort should have been made a year ago [redacted]. The DCI noted that CIA cannot be the point on this at the Hill, that we can't rely on legislative technicians but that substantive people have to be involved and that not enough is being surfaced in the US public media about the threat posed [redacted].

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9. Mr. McFarlane asked about the Budget and the DDCI briefed on where we are on NFIP.

10. Mr. McFarlane noted he had discussed the MX issue with Senator Goldwater who indicated that if this was a pivotal issue with the Soviets, he could change his position. In Mr. McFarlane's view, this indicates an open mind on the Senator's part.

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12. The DCI noted it was important that the right person had to be found to replace Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Richard DeLauer and recommended Bud Wheelon. Mr. McFarlane suggested that the DCI mention Wheelon to the Secretary of Defense (which the DCI did the next morning.)

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